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RÉSUMÉ
La question de la conﬁance à accorder aux traducteurs et aux interprètes est débattue 
depuis longtemps dans la profession. Dans certains cas, un ensemble de procédures 
sont établies aﬁn de susciter la conﬁance des clients et des utilisateurs. Au sein du 
Tribunal militaire pour l’Extrême-Orient (1946-1948), ces procédures ont pris une forme 
particulière. Pendant le procès, trois groupes différents sur les plans social et ethnique 
assumaient trois fonctions différentes dans le cadre du processus global d’interprétation : 
les Japonais interprétaient, les Américains d’origine japonaise contrôlaient, et les ofﬁciers 
militaires américains jouaient le rôle d’« arbitres » linguistiques qui tranchaient en cas 
de controverse. Les aspects sociopolitiques tels que la conﬁance, le pouvoir et le contrôle 
sont évidents dans cette structure hiérarchique. Dans de tels environnements politiques 
ainsi que dans d’autres que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, le besoin de faire conﬁance 
à l’interprète peut prendre le pas sur la qualité de l’interprétation.
ABSTRACT
The trustworthiness of translators and interpreters has long been an issue in the profes-
sion. In some cases, a set of procedures are established to ensure the trust of clients and 
end-users. In the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946-1948), such pro-
cedures took on remarkable form. During the trial, three ethnically and socially different 
groups of language personnel engaged in three different functions within the overall 
interpreting process: Japanese nationals as interpreters, Japanese Americans as monitors, 
and U.S. military ofﬁcers as language arbiters who ruled on the disputed interpretations. 
Sociopolitical aspects such as trust, power and control are evident in this hierarchical 
structure. In such political settings, and in others seen today, the trustworthiness of the 
interpreter may override the quality of interpreting.
MOTS-CLÉS/KEYWORDS
Tribunal militaire international pour l’Extrême-Orient, moniteur, médiateur linguistique, 
conﬁance, pouvoir, contrainte
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, monitor, language arbiter, trust, power, 
control
1. Introduction
The trustworthiness of translators and interpreters has long been an issue in the 
ethics of the profession. Often professional practice itself can be seen as a set of pro-
cedures for gaining and maintaining the trust of clients and end-users. In interpret-
ing, such procedures may include monitoring the work of interpreters. The best 
documented interpreter monitoring system is probably the one employed at the 
Nuremberg Trial. It was not used, however, as a means to police the interpreters’ 
behavior, but rather as a way to ensure smooth operation of the interpreting arrange-
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ments in a formal international setting during the nascent stage of simultaneous 
interpreting. This view is confirmed by the fact that interpreting errors were some-
times corrected by the interpreters themselves who checked the daily transcript 
against the verbatim recording (Gaiba 1998: 71, 97–98). In other words, there was no 
separate authority responsible for the monitoring. 
Around the same time, the much-less-documented interpreting arrangements 
at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) involved quite a dif-
ferent monitoring system. Here, three ethnically and socially different groups of 
linguists1 engaged in three different functions in the interpreting process: Japanese 
nationals as interpreters, Japanese Americans as monitors, and U.S. military officers 
as language arbiters who ruled on the disputed interpretations. By drawing on the 
concepts of trust, power and control, this paper explores why the tribunal devised 
this unusual organization to address the language needs during the trial.
2. Trust, power and control
In an interpreter-mediated event, when different parties represent different interests, 
the party wielding the authority to select the interpreters will most likely avoid using 
interpreters who seem to have a conflict of interest, due to suspicions that they may 
act in “bad faith” to advance their own agenda. Such suspicions arise from the 
“power” that the interpreters are perceived to possess.
Anderson (1976: 218-221) argues that “the interpreter’s position as the person in 
the middle has the advantage of power inherent in all positions that control scarce 
resources,” and that the interpreter can monopolize the means of communication. 
Laster and Taylor (1994: 111) point to this “power” as the reason lawyers try to regu-
late and constrain the interpreter’s role as “neutral machines or ‘conduits’.” The 
monolingual user’s fear that interpreters may exercise such “power” to advance their 
own interests is not completely unwarranted. Examples of such interpreters include 
the one who deliberately misinterpreted for a Gaelic poet defendant in 18th century 
Ireland (Cronin 2002: 55), and the sign language interpreter in Ukraine who delivered 
her own political message on television while pretending to be interpreting the 2004 
election results (Zarakhovich 2005). 
The user’s mistrust of the interpreter arising out of an absence of shared interest 
or affiliation has been discussed throughout the history of interpreting: William of 
Rubruck in the 13th century suspected that his Armenian interpreters distorted their 
interpretation (Bowen 1995: 254-255); European embassies complained about the 
incompetence and disloyalty of Levantine dragomans in the Ottoman era (Lewis 
2004: 25-26); and, in the 1820 trial of Queen Caroline of England, the defense was 
concerned about the impartiality of the Italian interpreter provided by the prosecu-
tion (Morris 1999: 19). In today’s context of the Iraq war, the inventor of IraqComm, 
a portable two-way interpreting device, suggests that human interpreters are not 
entirely trusted and “[t]he interpreters may have their own political agenda” (Precoda 
quoted in Abate 2006). 
In response to such concerns about trust, the party in power may establish a 
system to regulate and control the interpreter. Hermans (2000: 4-7) discusses several 
historical examples such as interpreters during the European discovery of America 
and Oranda tsuji (Dutch interpreters) in 17th-19th century Japan to point out the 
“tight controls on translators and interpreters to guarantee their trustworthiness, to 
ensure that they speak exclusively with their masters’ voice.” Referring to the over-
seers of the dragomans in Ancient Egypt, Pym (1998: 186) also draws attention to 
the institutionalization of translation where “hierarchical control is established; 
boundaries are maintained.” Within this institution, according to Cronin (2002: 58), 
“[t]he role of interpreters throughout history has been crucially determined by the 
prevailing hierarchical constitution of power and their position in it.” 
These sociopolitical aspects of interpreting are patent in the hierarchical struc-
ture of interpreting and the role of each linguist group during the IMTFE. The 
background of the interpreting arrangements and the linguists who were involved 
in the interpreting process at the IMTFE is discussed below, focusing on issues of 
trust, power and control. 
3. International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)
The IMTFE is more commonly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, or the 
Tokyo Trial. This was essentially the Japanese counterpart of the Nuremberg Trial. 
The IMTFE was established by the Charter of the IMTFE under the direction of US 
Army General Douglas MacArthur. It convened on May 3, 1946, and adjourned on 
November 12, 1948. 
There were 28 “Class A” defendants, mostly military and political leaders in war-
time Japan. A panel of 11 judges presided over the tribunal, one from each of the 
allied powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands, the Republic of China, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and the 
Philippines. The president was the Australian judge Sir William Webb. The prosecu-
tion team, consisting of representatives from the allied powers, was led by Chief 
Prosecutor Joseph Keenan of the United States. 
The indictment accused the defendants of “crimes against peace,” “war crimes” 
and “crimes against humanity.” During the trial, two of the defendants died of natu-
ral causes, and one had a nervous breakdown and was found incompetent to stand 
trial. The remaining 25 were all found guilty. Seven were sentenced to death by hang-
ing, 16 to life imprisonment, and two to lesser terms. 
4. Interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE
The use of interpreters and translators at the IMTFE was set forth by the tribunal 
charter. Under the heading “Fair Trial for Accused,” Article 9 (b) states, “Language. 
The trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language 
of the accused. Translations of documents and other papers shall be provided as 
needed and requested (Amended Charter of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East, April 26, 1946).” 
Accordingly, interpreting between English and Japanese was offered throughout 
the proceedings, but Russian simultaneous interpreting was also provided as a stand-
alone arrangement for the Soviet judge who did not understand English or Japanese. 
The tribunal also used interpreters of Chinese, French, Dutch, German, Russian and 
Mongolian when witnesses and prosecutors spoke in these languages. 
IBM equipment, identical to that used at Nuremberg, was installed in the 
IMTFE. However, consecutive was the predominant mode of interpreting because 
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the tribunal came to the conclusion that simultaneous interpreting between English 
and Japanese was impossible. The simultaneous mode was used only when the 
speaker read a document and its translation was available to the interpreter. In effect, 
this was nothing more than simultaneous reading of a prepared translation.
As previously discussed, the most salient feature of the interpreting arrange-
ments at the IMTFE was the presence of three tiers of linguists. The first tier consisted 
of the interpreters who interpreted the proceedings. They were all Japanese nationals. 
The transcripts record a total of 27 Japanese-English interpreters, but only a handful 
of them worked regularly throughout the trial (Watanabe 1998: 10–11). 
The second tier comprised the monitors. Four Nisei (second-generation Japanese 
Americans) worked as monitors. They monitored the interpretation, and interjected 
to correct interpreting errors, coordinate the turns of speakers and add explanations 
to the interpretation for the court participants. They also simultaneously read the 
translations of the indictment, the opening statements, the judgment (verdict) and 
other prepared statements. 
The Language Arbitration Board was the last tier. This board consisted of one 
member appointed by the tribunal and one each by the defense and the prosecution, 
and ruled on any disputed translations and interpretations. The member appointed 
by the tribunal was designated the language arbiter, and announced the rulings in 
court. Two Caucasian military officers played this role at different times over the 
course of the trial. 
5. The tribunal’s explanation of the Language Arbitration Board
Why did the IMTFE have this three-tier system of linguists to address its interpret-
ing needs? There is an official explanation in the judgment as to why the Language 
Arbitration Board was established: “Part a, Section I Establishment and Proceedings 
of the Tribunal” states, 
[T]he need to have every word spoken in Court translated from English into Japanese, 
or vice versa, has at least doubled the length of the proceedings. Translations cannot 
be made from the one language into the other with the speed and certainty which can 
be attained in translating one Western speech into another. Literal translation from 
Japanese into English or the reverse is often impossible. To a large extent nothing but 
a paraphrase can be achieved, and experts in both languages will often differ as to the 
correct paraphrase. In the result the interpreters in Court often had difficulty as to the 
rendering they should announce, and the Tribunal was compelled to set up a Language 
Arbitration Board to settle matters of disputed interpretation (The Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 1948).
This statement basically refers to the difficulty of interpreting between Japanese 
and English, and acknowledges that there can be more than one correct version in 
translations and interpretations. It does not, however, explain why the monitor was 
appointed, and why three different socio-ethnic groups were engaged in three dif-
ferent functions. In pursuit of an answer, let us examine the background of the 
interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE.
6. Military trials in Manila and Japanese interpreters at the IMTFE
Prior to the establishment of the IMTFE on January 19, 1946, there were U.S. military 
trials against two Japanese generals, Tomoyuki Yamashita and Masaharu Homma, 
in Manila, the Philippines. Correspondences by the U.S. military concerning the 
interpreting at the trials and a book written by one of Yamashita’s attorneys indicate 
that serious problems with the military interpreters were uncovered during the pro-
ceedings. 
For example, there is a military correspondence that discusses three officers who 
had been appointed court interpreters but refused to take the interpreter’s oath, citing 
their own lack of qualification in spoken Japanese (CINCAFPAC Manila 1945). In 
response to this incident, the Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, asks in a 
message dated October 28, 1945 (one day before the Yamashita trial convened), “Why 
was competent interpreter personnel not selected in sufficient time to prevent this 
outrageous failure?” 
Yamashita had a personal interpreter named Masakatsu Hamamoto. The 
Harvard-educated Hamamoto had been a civilian interpreter attached to the Japanese 
army during the war. He was indispensable to the communications that took place 
outside the courtroom such as in discussions between Yamashita and his counsel 
and in Yamashita’s psychiatric evaluations. But Hamamoto was not permitted to act 
as an official court interpreter because he was also a prisoner of war.
According to Reel (1971: 145-146), who was one of Yamashita’s defense attor-
neys, 
[t]he official court interpreters were divided into two groups – American Nisei soldiers, 
whose Japanese was fairly good when restricted to elementary or “kindergarten” 
expressions but whose English left much to be desired, causing them frequently to take 
liberties in altering counsel’s questions to fit their knowledge of the languages, and a 
number of American naval and marine officers, whose English was excellent but whose 
Japanese was spotty and required constant use of translation dictionaries.
To address this problem, Hamamoto was permitted to sit beside Yamashita 
 during the trial to do whisper-interpreting from English into Japanese. Reel (1971: 
145-146) writes, “This was a tour de force of stupendous proportions that had the 
effect of shortening the proceedings by many weeks, for, without Hamamoto, the 
court interpreters would have had to translate the entire trial for the accused.” 
Hamamoto, however, was not allowed to interpret Yamashita’s testimony into English 
for the court. 
The official interpreters’ renditions were slow and required frequent pauses. Reel 
(1971: 14-15, 148) uses such adjectives as “painstaking,” “bumbling” and “exasperat-
ing” in references to the official interpreters in his book. In addition, discussions over 
disputed interpretations took much of the time in court. There was even an incident 
in which newspaper reporters who had pointed out interpreting errors were called 
to testify in court and to elaborate on their opinions (Reel 1971: 45-49).
Yamashita was sentenced to death by hanging on December 7, 1945 (the fourth 
anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack), and executed on February 23, 1946. 
Interviews with Takashi Oka (2005) and Masakazu Shimada (2000), who interpreted 
in more than 200 sessions during the IMTFE, confirm that the recruiting and testing 
of Japanese interpreters for the IMTFE took place in January and February 1946. 
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Documents that explicitly link the interpreting problems in Manila to the tribunal’s 
decision to open its interpreter search to Japanese nationals have not been located. 
A number of correspondences (in the Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation 
Headquarters, World War II in the National Archives), however, clearly suggest that 
the Legal Section of the Superior Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), which 
established the procedural guidelines of the IMTFE, was aware of the interpreting 
problems in Manila. The IMTFE could not afford to have the same problems, given 
the fact that it was an international forum and not a U.S. military trial, and that it 
had attracted close attention from all over the world. The tribunal must have recog-
nized the need for competent interpreters, regardless of nationality or civilian status, 
who could facilitate smooth proceedings. This can explain the inclusion of Japanese 
nationals in the interpreting arrangements. This view is supported by Shimada’s 
remarks (Shimada 2000: 20-21), discussed below.
7. Nisei monitors 
Many of the recruited interpreters were diplomats with the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Shimada was a former soldier with the Japanese Imperial Army. 
Given the fact that three foreign ministers, two diplomats and 17 military leaders 
were included among the 28 defendants, these interpreters were, in effect, interpret-
ing in a trial in which their former superiors’ lives were at stake.
Just as it is hard to imagine former Nazi members interpreting at Nuremberg, it 
is conceivable that the tribunal was concerned about its interpreters’ “impartiality” 
and was loath to appear dependent on citizens of the defeated nation; hence, the 
tribunal decided to establish a system to regulate and control the interpreters’ work. 
Documents that explicitly describe such concerns on the part of the tribunal and the 
decision to monitor the interpreting have not been found, but interviews with 
Shimada (2000) and Oka (2005, 2006) generally support such a supposition. 
According to Shimada (2000: 20-21), the tribunal’s Language Section selected four 
Nisei to supervise the Japanese interpreters because the chief of the section did not 
understand the Japanese language. 
The fact that all the prepared translations, such as the opening statements and 
the judgment, were rendered by the Nisei monitors indicates the tribunal’s preference 
for using non-Japanese rather than Japanese citizens. Shimada says (2000: 34): 
It was a given from the beginning, and it was expected. Whether it’s the judgment or 
something else, it’s the Americans who should be interpreting. Everything! But because 
they were not competent, Japanese were hired … There were no such [capable 
American] people. Something formal, like the arraignment – things that were pre-
sented at the beginning and the end of the trial – were prepared in writing beforehand. 
They were translated, Japanese lawyers checked them, and Americans read [the trans-
lations at the trial]. So, we never said anything like “Tojo, death by hanging!”2
8. Language arbiter
As cited in the judgment, the Language Arbitration Board was established as a “ref-
eree” to settle disputes over translations and interpretations. When a translation or 
interpretation was challenged by the defense or the prosecution, the tribunal presi-
dent referred the matter to the language arbiter. After deliberation among the board 
members outside the courtroom, the language arbiter announced the ruling in the 
following court session. Major Lardner Moore was the first language arbiter. 
According to Moore (1980), a naturalized Japanese-American lawyer represented the 
prosecution, and a Japanese citizen who had been the editor of an English magazine 
represented the defense. Moore says he let these two members of the board discuss 
and agree on the rulings and merely reported their decisions to the court. 
After Moore was discharged, Captain Edward Kraft assumed the arbiter position. 
The roster of the Military Intelligence Service Language School indicates that Kraft 
had studied Japanese in elementary level classes for only one year. According to 
Moore (1980), however, he was more involved in the board’s deliberations and he 
“had his own ideas about what’s to be done.”
The Language Arbitration Board probably served to minimize the time spent 
discussing interpreting and translation disputes in court. In addition, the language 
arbiter most likely kept an eye on the monitors as well. The monitors were all Kibei 
(Nisei who received education in Japan and returned to the United States), who suf-
fered even greater prejudice than other Japanese Americans, as they were suspected 
of being “pro-Japanese” (Kono 2003). Three of the four monitors had been sent to 
internment camps after the Pearl Harbor attack. Although they volunteered from the 
camps to go to the U.S. military’s Japanese language school to teach or train for 
military intelligence, they had to fight prejudice and suspicions of disloyalty within 
the U.S. military while they served in the Pacific (McNaughton 1994). Kawamoto 
(2005), who worked as a translator at the IMTFE, discusses the resentment he felt 
when he was sent to the Pacific from the language school with a dog tag that had the 
address of the internment camp where his parents were detained. The SCAP may 
have been concerned that these monitors were sympathetic to the Japanese defen-
dants because of their background, and thus wanted to deter them from being too 
accommodating of the defendants’ needs. The language arbiter, a Caucasian military 
officer, may have functioned to address such concerns, and to give the appearance 
that the U.S. military was in charge of the procedure. 
The absence of high-ranking Japanese Americans at the time could explain in 
part why Caucasian military officers fulfilled the role as language arbiter. Organiza-
tional planning documents of the tribunal (in the Records of the Allied Operational 
and Occupation Headquarters, World War II in the National Archives) called for an 
officer of a specific military rank to fill each of the high positions in respective sec-
tions, including the Language Section. Designated as “enemy aliens,” Japanese 
Americans were never allowed in the Navy’s elite Japanese language schools (Slesnick 
2006: 2-3). Even those who went to the Army’s language school were not commis-
sioned until toward the end of the war. This war-time segregation may explain the 
absence of Nisei in higher positions in the tribunal’s Language Section as well. 
9. Modern-day parallels?
In today’s context, the trustworthiness of translators and interpreters is sometimes 
discussed in the U.S.-led intelligence and military activities. For example, one of the 
major reasons the U.S. government has not been able to recruit enough Arabic trans-
lators and interpreters for its war and intelligence efforts is the requirement of a 
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top-secret security clearance (Reed 2005). A defense contractor which supplies trans-
lators and interpreters of Arabic, Pashto, Dari, etc. also requires the applicants to 
hold a U.S. passport and pass the government’s security check and “counterintelli-
gence/force protection screening” (L-3 Titan 2006). These efforts can be viewed as a 
system to regulate and control interpreters in order to assure their trustworthiness.
As for the contemporary war crimes trials or military trials, any systematic 
monitoring of interpreters’ performance has hardly been documented.3 Although 
trust, power and control issues in interpreting are still relevant in today’s context, 
the monitoring system at the IMTFE should probably be considered as a special case. 
It involved a variety of complex elements, such as the use of a lesser learned language, 
the absence of professionally trained interpreters, the political nature of the setting, 
and race issues. 
10. Conclusion
In the socio-political context, when a party in power has to rely on interpreters who 
do not have shared interest or affiliation, the party may set up a system to regulate 
and control the interpreters out of concerns over their trustworthiness. This scenario 
is evident in the case of the IMTFE: The tribunal wanted to use U.S. military person-
nel as interpreters, but it found them incompetent and had to resort to bilingual 
Japanese nationals. The tribunal did not trust the “impartiality” of those Japanese 
interpreters, and was loath to appear dependent on citizens of the defeated nation. 
So, it used four Japanese Americans to monitor the interpretation. The language 
arbiter (a Caucasian U.S. army officer) may also have functioned to keep an eye on 
the Japanese American monitors, who may have been suspected of being sympathetic 
to the accused, and to maintain the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge. 
In sum, this hierarchical structure of linguists functioned as a display of authority 
and a check against any “bad faith” harbored by those who didn’t seem to share the 
same interests with the tribunal. 
Although the transcripts show that the monitors did correct some interpreting 
errors, they also indicate that there were a number of unnecessary or incorrect inter-
jections by the monitors (Takeda 2007). The incompetence of some monitors is 
referred to in Shimada’s interview (2000: 21, 23) as well. Asked if he believed that the 
monitors were needed for achieving a higher level of accuracy, Oka (2006) answered, 
“Whether or not the monitoring was needed has nothing to do with interpreting. It 
was a political matter. In a nutshell, [the tribunal] didn’t fully trust the Japanese 
interpreters, and that’s why the monitor and the language board were established.”4 
As Lefevere (1992: 2) suggests, it may be “important to remember that trust is invested 
in the producer of the translation, not necessarily in the product itself.” In some 
political settings, “[t]rust may be more important than quality.” 
NOTES
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the New Research in Translation and Interpreting 
Studies conference in Tarragona, Spain, in 2005. 
1. Personnel who engaged in language-related functions at the IMTFE were called “linguists.” 
Therefore, the term “linguists” is used in this study to refer to language-related personnel and not 
to persons who study linguistics.
2. The author’s translations from Japanese.
3. One method to check the interpreter’s performance has been reported (Regulatory Intelligence 
Data, April 4, 2006): When the military commission failed to provide an interpreter for a terror-
ist suspect and had to rely on the defense team’s interpreter at Guantanamo Bay, the audio of the 
interpretation was later checked by the commission to verify the accuracy. 
4. The author’s translations from Japanese.
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